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PAYING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
SERVICES: THE CASE OF
BRAZILIAN AMAZONIA
ANTHONY HALL*
Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics, London, WC2A 2AE, UK
Abstract: Compensating natural resource users for the environmental services they supply is
becoming an increasingly attractive policy option in a number of countries. Ranging from
ofﬁcial carbon trading through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto
Protocol to more informal arrangements, payments for environmental services (PES) can offer
ﬁnancial incentives for promoting ecologically sound conservation and development practices.
PES principles could be applied more widely in Brazilian Amazonia to help curb high rates of
deforestation which are gradually undermining the region’s capacity to supply key services
such as carbon sequestration, biodiversity maintenance and water cycling, and to sustain
people’s natural resource-dependent livelihoods. This potential could be especially signiﬁcant
if avoided deforestation were eventually to be permitted for acquiring certiﬁed emissions
offsets under the CDM. Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Providing ﬁnancial compensation to natural resource-users for their contribution to the
long-term preservation of the physical environment through ‘payments for environmental
services’ (PES) has climbed high on the international policy agenda (UNDP, 2005; WRI,
2005; Stern, 2006). The search for new instruments such as PES has intensiﬁed with the
gradual move away from a total reliance on punitive, command-and-control interventions
in environmental policy, and towards a sustainable development approach which attempts
to reconcile outright protectionism with economic activities to sustain the livelihoods of
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local populations. Paying people to conserve ecosystems for wider beneﬁt rather than
degrade them for individual, short-term gain has an obvious appeal. Not only are punitive
systems based solely on negative sanctions notoriously ineffective in the context of
developing countries with weak institutions and limited policing capacity. Providing
ﬁnancial incentives to the poor can generate income and employment for resource users
while helping to conserve ecosystems, supporting local populations as major stewards of
the environment.
Paying resource users to sustain vital environmental services adds a signiﬁcant
dimension to previous approaches by recognising that usually intangible functions, which
have traditionally been considered ‘free’ public goods, have a value that can bemeasured in
economic, social and ecological terms. The growing scarcity of these services as
ecosystems come under pressure makes them tradable; they include, for example,
biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration, watershed management and maintenance
of landscape beauty. They underpin environmental sustainability at local, national and
global levels; a case of local action having global impacts and implications (Hall, 2005).
Yet the PES approach also recognises that, as a contingent method, costs are incurred and
trade-offs are inevitable as competing interests are reconciled through the making of
compensation payments.
Brazil is becoming a testing ground for the design and application of environmental
service payments, illustrating both the potential for this method as well as its pitfalls and
limitations. Although still very much in its infancy, experiments with PES are being made
in the southern industrial heartland (see below). Yet it is in the Amazon region where PES
offers the greatest potential for simultaneously improving the livelihoods of poor
resource-users while helping to reduce rates of deforestation and limit greenhouse gas
emissions. Globally, deforestation is the source of about 20 per cent of greenhouse gases,
the second largest contributor after fossil fuels. In Brazil, however, where Amazonia covers
almost two-thirds of the surface area, deforestation and associated burning was responsible
for over 70 per cent of the country’s CO2 emissions by the early 1990s and this proportion
has increased since then (UNFCCC, 2005a; Stern, 2006). The strategic targeting of PES
policies on critical areas of settlement and deforestation in Amazonia could, therefore, help
slow down the region’s persistently high rates of destruction and maintain key
environmental services generated by the standing forest.
The main market in environmental services involves greenhouse gas emissions trading,
principally for the purpose of carbon sequestration. In terms of international ﬁnancial
ﬂows, the potential role of forests (Amazonia in particular) in averting global warming is
especially signiﬁcant (WRI, 2005; Stern, 2006). Based on article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol,
forest carbon projects entered the policy arena via the Clean Development Mechanism
(1997) of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC). For the ﬁrst
commitment period (2008–2012), the CDM has set a mandatory combined emissions
reduction target for industrialised countries of 5 per cent below 1990 levels. Individual
country targets vary, while the US and Australia infamously refused to sign up.
Within the CDM, Northern enterprises producing ‘excessive’ greenhouse gases may
offset their surplus by purchasing credits from organisations that under-produce such
emissions, moving towards ‘carbon neutral’ status in due course. In their turn, although not
yet bound to speciﬁc targets by the CDM, developing countries have begun to sell carbon
credits to northern enterprises. In the forest sector such trading is based on environmental
services generated by the restoration of degraded lands and reforestation projects.
Controversially, the maintenance of standing forest (‘avoided deforestation’) is not at
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present included in the CDM as a vehicle for the acquisition of carbon credits.1 This
restriction has major implications for Brazil’s future participation in carbon trading markets.
A growing number of industrial enterprises are entering into voluntary agreements outside
of the Kyoto Protocol. This ‘informality’ has the dual advantage of allowing companies to test
how the system works for future reference and to strengthen their ‘green’ credentials.
According to the World Bank, the value of carbon trading has grown from US$10 billion in
2005 to US$30 billion in 2006 (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2007). These credits were purchased
mainly by rich countries under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (US$24.3 billion) and to
meet their obligations under the CDM (US$4.8 billion), but voluntary offsets have grown to
reach US$100million in 2006. Not just industrial enterprises but also banks, airlines and other
companies are joining the fray through trading channels such as the Chicago Climate
Exchange and the New SouthWalesMarket (Bayon et al., 2006; Capoor andAmbrosi, 2007).
2 PAYING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
It has been established that natural ecosystems provide services which beneﬁt humanity,
thus possessing both intrinsic and potential economic value (Daily, 1997; Daily and
Ellison, 2002). In the case of Amazonia, arguments have long been put forward for the
more rational use of economic instruments to promote sustainable forest management to
attend to the basic needs of local populations and wider interests (Fearnside, 1989, 1997).
In order to harness this value, making PES is based on the principle that the external
beneﬁciaries of such services may make direct, contractual payments to local landholders
and resource-users in return for adopting practices to restore and sustain ecosystems. By
providing incentives to both suppliers and consumers of environmental services, PES
hopes to encourage ecosystem preservation in situations where traditional comman-
d-and-control methods are on their own unlikely to work properly.
The PES approach has certain distinctive features which make it broadly appealing to
stakeholders (Wunder, 2005). In principle, it has the following advantages: (i) Voluntarism.
Unlike conventional ‘fences-and-ﬁnes’ policies, PES is essentially a voluntary, negotiated
framework between those who supply environmental services and those who exercise demand
for them. However, the principle of payments can also be built into more traditional, obligatory
conservation policies to reward service suppliers; (ii)Quantiﬁcation. In order for payments to be
calculated, services should ideally be quantiﬁable; for example, in terms of tons of carbon stored,
area reforested, deforestation avoided or volume of clean water supplied; (iii) Contingency-
based. Payments to service providers are conditional upon a continuous supply beingmaintained
and uponmonitoring of compliancewithin negotiated agreements; and (iv) Flexible format. PES
schemes may adopt a number of formats. They are mainly area-based (for example, protected
conservation units and catchments or forest-carbon plantations). Increasingly, however, they are
product-focused around ‘green’ or certiﬁed items such as sustainably managed timber, forest
fruits or ecotourism. There is no guarantee, however, that revenues generated will feed back into
ecosystem maintenance. Schemes may be publicly managed (as in the case of Costa Rica
mentioned below) or, far more typically, involve mixed arrangements embracing partnerships of
communities, government agencies, private companies and NGOs.
1In the CDM, the only eligible activities under the ‘land-use, land-use change and forestry’ (LULUCF) category
are reforestation, afforestation and forest management. An industrialised country is allowed to offset no more than
1 per cent of its base-year emissions through CDM forestry projects. In practice, such projects have not proved to
be a popular option and they are expected to account for just 0.22 per cent of CDM credits by 2012 (Karaousakis,
2007).
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Int. Dev. 20, 965–981 (2008)
DOI: 10.1002/jid
Paying for Environmental Services 967
By 2004, some 300 PES schemes had been identiﬁed around the world, located
principally in the industrialised countries (Mayrand and Paquin, 2004). At September
2007, almost 800 projects were registered under the CDM, with a further 78 having
requested registration and over 2100 more in the pipeline (UNFCCC/CDM, 2007). India
has the largest proportion of registered schemes (35 per cent), followed by China (15 per
cent), Brazil (14 per cent) and Mexico (11 per cent). In addition, other projects are funded
through an increasingly large, informal carbon market (Bayon et al., 2006).
Costa Rica boasts the world’s only national PES system. Introduced in 1996, it rewards
landowners for conserving forests through reforestation and maintenance of existing areas.
Industries compensate their carbon emissions through a tax on fossil fuels and purchase of
carbon offset certiﬁcates, the revenue from which helps fund the PES programme. Initial
support was received from the World Bank and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF).
The scheme now covers some 10 per cent of the country and beneﬁts around 8000
landowners engaged in forest protection, management and reforestation over 500 000
hectares, at a cost to date of US$120 million (Zbinden and Lee, 2004; Karaousakis, 2007).
Apart from Costa Rica’s national PES programme, other experiences in the South are
limited to a relatively small number of projects in Latin America and elsewhere
(Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; McShane and Wells, 2004; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005). For
example, in the Cauca Valley, Colombia, downstream sugarcane growers affected by ﬂooding
pay poor upland farmers to protect thewatershed, reducing damage and bringing development
beneﬁts to the communities. From 1995 to 2000, some $1.5 million was generated for
investments in the uplands. Mexico’s pioneering programme of payments for environmental
hydrological services (PEHS), introduced in 2003, protects over 600000 hectares of cloud
forest and lowland rain forest in both private and collective (ejido) areas (Karaousakis, 2007).
China’s sloping land programme, started in 1999 to encourage planting in erosion-vulnerable
areas, covers seven million hectares and is set to double in size (Chomitz et al., 2007).
Although resource conservation and not poverty alleviation was the original, overriding
objective of PES schemes, the idea has been seized upon for its potential to link
environmental payments to the strengthening of local livelihoods (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005;
Murdiyarso et al., 2005; Wunder, 2005). Indeed, this ‘pro-poor PES’ concept is enshrined
in the Millennium Development Goals.2 The discovery of this potential is hardly
surprising, given the fact that local inhabitants and resource-users, if provided with
appropriate support, are arguably the most effective guardians of forests and other
populated ecosystems. Although there is an issue to be considered when designing such
schemes concerning equity versus efﬁciency (see below), research shows that PES
payments can have a signiﬁcant impact on the livelihoods of the poor and may contribute
up to 40 per cent or more of household income (Wunder, 2005).
3 THE AMAZON CONTEXT
Deforestation is an increasingly serious problem in the Amazon. About three-quarters of
Brazilian Amazonia comprises tropical moist forest, with the remainder consisting of savannah
grassland (cerrado), largely on its southern fringes. In recent years, annual forest loss has
averaged about 20 000km2; in 2003–2004 it rose to 27 000km2, the second highest ever
recorded (having reached 29000km2 in 1995) but in 2005–2006 fell back to 13 100m2. A
2MDG Target 9, Goal 7 identiﬁes the preservation of ecosystem services for ‘equitable environmental manage-
ment and poverty reduction’.
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further 15000km2 is damaged annually by forest ﬁres and illegal logging (Nepstad et al.,
1999). Although just 17 per cent of Brazil’s Amazon rainforest has been totally lost to
clear-felling, half of the region has been affected by human activity, with currently intact areas
in the west coming under growing threat. Forest fragmentation has led to further biodiversity
loss owing to the reduced ability of small areas to support ﬂora and fauna (Lovejoy, 2000).
It has been calculated that, at current rates of destruction, almost 50 per cent of the
Amazon rainforest will have disappeared by 2050 (Soares-Filho et al., 2006).
Deforestation and forest ﬁres in Brazil emit 200–300 million tons of carbon a year
(reaching up to 500 tons per hectare annually in dense rainforest), while fossil fuels account
for less than 100 tons overall. Climate change projections for the Amazon based on the
HadCM3 model3 predict major forest die-back and savannisation of the region by 2050 at
current rates of deforestation, leading to an average temperature rise of 28–38C and a
rainfall reduction of 10–20 per cent (Cox et al., 2004; Marengo, 2006, 2008; Greenpeace,
2006; Betts, 2008; Huntingford et al., 2008; Nobre, 2008).
These disturbing ﬁgures attest to the steady erosion of Amazonia’s natural resource base
and the seemingly inexorable undermining of its ability to supply vital environmental
services. Under the military regime from 1964 to 1985 an aggressive strategy of regional
development was implemented, favouring large landowners and commercial enterprises but
also encouraging small farmer settlement (Hall, 1989). Overall, medium and large-scale
cattle ranching has been responsible for around 70 per cent of forest loss in the region,
small-scale farming for some 20 per cent and commercial logging and mining for the
remainder (Fearnside, 2005). Subsequent civilian governments have been equally supportive
of settlement and commercial development policies that have led to consistently high rates of
forest loss. Expansion of the highway network and soybean cultivation in the Amazon has
recently added to such pressures (Fearnside, 2005; GTF, 2005; Greenpeace, 2006).
Deforestation rates in Brazilian Amazonia respond principally, at least in the short to
medium term, not to environmental policy as such but rather to the macro-economic
climate and the resulting ﬁnancial incentives that encourage land speculation, ranching and
farming. For example, the peak rainforest destruction year of 1995 reﬂects economic
recovery under Brazil’s Plano Real which encouraged investment, while the subsequent
drop in deforestation during 1996–1997 was a response to the fall in inﬂation and land
values (Fearnside, 2005). Similarly, the fall in deforestation rates registered during
2005–2006 has been attributed in large measure to the drop in commodity prices and US
dollar, while the subsequent increase in forest loss has been put down to the increased price
of soybean (ESP, 2007b). In terms of policies designed to directly control deforestation, the
most successful strategy has arguably been the designation of protected areas. Some 40 per
cent of the region is set aside under either the National System of Conservation Units—
SNUC (including biological reserves, national parks, national forests and extractive
reserves, amongst others) or as indigenous reserves.
Levels of legal protection vary considerably by state, ranging from the relatively intact
and sparsely populated Amazonas in the west to long-settled, degraded and conﬂict-ridden
Para´ in the east of the region. Outright conservation has been relatively effective
in preventing deforestation and maintaining environmental services, although serious
problems remain with vigilance and law enforcement, including susceptibility to illegal
logging and informal mining. Brazil’s Forest Code (1965) requires that 80 per cent of forest
cover on individual properties in the Amazon be maintained. Yet owners have no direct
3Hadley Centre Coupled Model, version 3.
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economic incentive to do so and the law is frequently ﬂouted as land is converted to pasture
or other legally designated ‘productive’ uses requiring forest removal.
There is an urgent need for new policy instruments such as PES to be applied in Amazonia,
complementing existing conservation measures, in order to create a more effective
environmental policy framework. Since the Earth Summit (1992), increasing emphasis has
been placed in Brazil and elsewhere on the incorporation of forest dwellers into programmes
of environmental governance. These have typically been labelled under the rubric of
‘integrated conservation and development projects’ (ICDPs) such as terrestrial and aquatic
extractive reserves, sustainable forest management, agroforestry initiatives and ecotourism.
This move towards reconciling natural resource conservation with livelihood strengthening,
or ‘productive conservation’ (Hall, 1997a), is still in its infancy but is ﬁnding greater space on
the policy agenda. However, the provision of indirect payments to encourage conservation
through ICDPs and similar schemes suffers from a number of problems. These include
institutional complexity, high administrative and ﬁnancial costs and poor sustainability
(Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). Being a more direct form of remuneration to forest peoples, PES
could help overcome some of these obstacles by generating longer-term income ﬂows for
participating groups in return for their conservation efforts. Yet as noted in the concluding
section below, many operational challenges remain.
4 PES POTENTIAL IN AMAZONIA
Brazilian Amazonia, the world’s largest remaining area of tropical rainforest, supplies
environmental services which are vital for national and global climatic stability. Although
calculating the economic value of environmental services is notoriously difﬁcult, it has
been estimated that in the case of Brazilian Amazonia such payments could generate
between US$500 million and $2.5 billion a year in revenues which could be used for
conservation (Fearnside, 2006a,b; The Economist, 2006). Farmers in the Amazon currently
destroy rainforest to create croplands and pastures worth perhaps US$200 per hectare. This
same area could yield US$10 000 in carbon payments at the EU price of US$20 per ton for
the average 500 tons of carbon emissions per hectare saved through avoided deforestation
(Chomitz et al., 2007). Yet even at far more modest prices, carbon payments could provide
a powerful incentive for farmers to preserve forest.
Amazonia supplies the following major environmental services:
(i) Carbon sequestration and storage. Carbon is stored in the biomass and soil, making
up half of the dry weight of trees. Deforestation releases much of this as carbon
dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) contributing to global warming. As already noted,
deforestation is the second largest global source of carbon after fossil fuels. In Brazil
itself, deforestation now accounts for almost 80 per cent of the nation’s CO2
emissions. Brazil is presently the world’s fourth largest emitter of total greenhouse
gases after the US, China and Russia (UNFCCC, 2005a, 2006a). As a vital
carbon sink, Amazonia accounts for 38 per cent of total tropical biomass, while
Amazon deforestation itself contributes signiﬁcantly to GHG emissions. Slowing
down deforestation could play an important role in curbing those very emissions and
ameliorating the process of global warming.4
4Deforestation, 20 per cent of which occurs in Brazil, accounts for some 18 per cent of global GHG emissions,
(Stern, 2006). Since in Brazil this is almost entirely due to forest loss in the Amazon it can be inferred that
deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia is thus responsible for around 3.5 per cent of the world’s emissions.
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(ii) Biodiversity protection. It is estimated that Brazilian Amazonia houses 20 per cent of
the world’s estimated 1.5 billion species (Capobianco et al., 2001). Aside from its
intrinsic value, this natural capital stock represents incalculable economic, social and
environmental wealth which has not only huge commercial potential for the country
but is essential for supporting the livelihoods of forest dwellers and local commu-
nities. Protection of biodiversity would automatically accompany forest maintenance
as mutually dependent environmental services.
(iii) Water cycling. The River Amazon contributes one-ﬁfth of total global ﬂuvial
discharge into the oceans (Araujo Lima et al., 1998). Deforestation substantially
reduces the region’s ability to recycle water vapour. Several studies have shown that
local evapotranspiration accounts for a large proportion of Amazonia’s rainfall,
ranging from about half to over 80 per cent (Marengo, 2006). Deforestation can
thus seriously affect water recycling patterns, giving rise to local and national impacts
on the weather and result in negative feed-back loops which may lead to further forest
die-back (as predicted by the HadCM3 climate change model mentioned above). The
south-eastern state of Sa˜o Paulo, for example, is dependent on the Amazon for 70 per
cent of its rainfall in December (Fearnside, 2005). Any reductions due to deforestation
will have serious repercussions, as has already been demonstrated during recent
drought episodes and resulting power blackouts.
(iv) Landscape beauty. Ecotourism is a fast-expanding ﬁeld, with pro-poor ecotourism
gradually establishing itself as a niche market catering for outsiders who wish to
spend time living in traditional communities (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002).
Preservation of Amazonia’s diverse ecosystems for tourism purposes by both larger
operators and small communities offers a valuable potential revenue source with a
built-in environmental service component. It can both help reduce deforestation and
maintain biodiversity by providing an alternative income source.
As the second commitment period (2013–2017) of the Kyoto Protocol approaches, there
will be intense pressure on major developing countries such as China, India and Brazil,
currently amongst theworld’s top polluters, to go beyond ratiﬁcation of the treaty and make
ﬁrm commitments to emissions reductions. Brazil is gradually joining the emissions
trading arena and has embarked on a number of carbon sequestration projects.
4.1 Existing PES Schemes in Brazil
4.1.1 Carbon projects
Brazil has the distinction of being home to the world’s ﬁrst project ofﬁcially registered
under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto protocol. The Nova Gerar landﬁll
scheme, located in the industrial region of Nova Iguac¸u in Rio de Janeiro, is funded through
the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF), managed by the World Bank. It will capture an
estimated 2.9 million tons of CO2 equivalent greenhouse gases by 2012. In the forest sector,
experience has so far been limited to a handful of voluntary carbon sequestration projects
based on reforestation of degraded areas. Three projects stand out, of which two are in the
Amazon (May et al., 2003; Grieg-Gran et al., 2005).
The Plantar carbon project in Minas Gerais (situated outside of Amazonia) and funded
through the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund aims to generate certiﬁed emissions
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reductions (CERs) to maintain the use of charcoal in the pig-iron industry instead of switching
to mineral coke, and to reforest 23 000 hectares with eucalyptus. It has, however, attracted
much criticism.5 The Peugeot carbon sink project is intended to reforest 2000 hectares in the
‘deforestation arc’ inMato Grosso. There is at present no intention to seek carbon credits under
Kyoto but rather to improve the environmental image of the car industry (sequestering
0.5 million tons of carbon over a period of 100 years) and to gain experience in the emerging
carbon market while encouraging forestry extension activities. Finally, the Bananal Island
conservation project in Tocantins state around the Araguaia National Park has been set up to
test the potential for carbon storage based on avoided deforestation, forest recuperation
and conservation inside public parklands. In addition to these carbon projects, the private
sector in Brazil is expanding its environmental actions in other ways. For example, the
Botica´rio Foundation (Brazil’s equivalent of the UK’s Body Shop) has announced plans to pay
US$12 million over 10 years to landowners who conserve the Atlantic rainforest at the
headwaters of Greater Sa˜o Paulo’s rivers (Nascimento Madureira, 2006).
4.1.2 Proambiente
The ﬁrst three above examples of corporate-sponsored carbon sequestration are promising
experiments in PES but they do not signiﬁcantly touch upon the lives of local populations.
Another initiative designed to compensate for environmental services rendered by the region’s
estimated 2.5 million small producers (including family farmers, extractivists, ﬁshers and
indigenous groups) in a total regional population of around 20 million is the ‘Sustainable
Development Programme for Rural Family Production in Amazonia’ (Proambiente). Originally
inspired by the non-governmental organisation IPAM, several pilot community schemes were
set up from 2001 by the Federation of Rural Trades Unions (FETAGRI), a broad coalition of
NGOs and small farmer organisations in search of an alternative development model that would
offer policy options to reconcile conservation with livelihood support in Amazonia. Following
consultation between civil society and government authorities,Proambientewas ofﬁcially taken
over in 2003 by the Ministry of the Environment (MMA, 2005).
Proambiente revolves around a ‘Programme of Socio-Environmental Services’
supported by a ‘Social-Environmental Fund’ to provide payments to small producers
for environmental services rendered, as well as a Support Fund for technical guidance,
extension, monitoring and certiﬁcation, supplemented where necessary by production
credit. Some 350 families in each of 11 ‘development poles’ throughout Amazonia (about
4000 families altogether) were initially involved. Certiﬁcation of sustainable local development
practices would in theory allow each participating family to receive one-third of a minimum
salary (about US$35) per month as payment for environmental services supplied.
By late 2007, however, results of Proambiente were mixed. Only half a dozen of the
projects were effectively operational and just 40 per cent of farmers in the scheme had
received one-off payments, amounting to R$650 (US$325) per household, considerably
less than that had been planned.6 Furthermore, because it has not yet been possible to
establish a formal channel for government budgetary support to Proambiente as originally
intended, emergency funding was granted through the G7 Pilot Programme. The
5Rural unions and environmental NGOs have opposed the inclusion of Plantar in the CDM on the grounds that it
has had negative environmental impacts by lowering the water table and caused social tensions with local farmers.
Other criticisms relate to its allegedly poor carbon storage potential and dubious baseline assumptions (EU, 2002).
6Comments on Proambiente, unless otherwise stated, are based on the author’s interviews with project
beneﬁciaries, local technicians and staff from the Ministry of the Environment and Ministry of Agrarian
Development, during August 2007.
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establishment of a proper ﬁnancial mechanism has been hampered by the lack of legal
recognition in Brazil at the federal level of the concept environmental services and of their
economic value. This situation contrasts with that of Costa Rica and Mexico, for example,
where a legal framework and government funding channels for their respective PES
programmes were established from the outset. In Brazil, the problem is only now being
addressed through several draft bills to Congress which aim to set up a ‘National
Programme of Environmental Services’ or ‘Green Fund’ (Bolsa Verde) for small farmers to
be ﬁnanced through international donations. Provision is also being made to secure more
permanent domestic funding for PES from the national budget.7
The state of Amazonas has stolen a march on the federal government by introducing the
country’s ﬁrst PES legislation. Under its ‘Law on Climatic Change, Environmental
Conservation and Sustainable Development’ (published in April, 2007), a monthly grant
(Bolsa Floresta) of R$50 (US$25) will be made to over 2000 households in six ‘sustainable
development’ protected areas within the state as compensation for their conservation
activities, eventually extending to 30 such reserves (Amazonas, 2007). AUS$1 billion fund
is to be established from domestic and international sources to ﬁnance the scheme over the
long-term. The Amazonian state of Acre is also entertaining a similar idea and it is possible
that, in future, state governments will assume an increasingly large responsibility for
instituting PES systems.8
4.1.3 Ecological VAT
The ‘ecological value-added tax’ (ICMS-E) allocates 2.5 per cent of state VAT revenues to
compensate regional governments for tax income lost due to the designation of standing
forests as protected areas. Introduced originally in southern Brazil, it has also been applied
in the Amazon states of Rondoˆnia and Mato Grosso. The measure has encouraged
conservation in states with high levels of protection (above 25 per cent) but it has tended to
beneﬁt larger landowners disproportionately (as in the Costa Rican case) and its potential
as a mechanism for ‘pro-poor’ PES is currently being examined (Grieg-Gran, 2000; May
et al., 2002; IIED, 2006).
4.2 Potential PES Initiatives in the Amazon
Although the number of PES initiatives in Brazil is extremely limited, there is major
potential for adding a service payment dimension to a range of existing ‘productive
conservation’ projects in order to help them become more ﬁnancially self-sufﬁcient. In
Amazonia, extractive reserves, agroforestry and sustainable forest management are related
areas in which PES could help generate a more continuous income stream to make them
more independent of the ﬁxed project cycle and budget on which so many such projects are
almost totally dependent, especially during their earlier phase. This perception found
political expression at the second meeting of Amazonia’s ‘peoples of the forest’ held in
Brasilia in September 2007. The ﬁnal declaration demanded that ‘indigenous peoples
and traditional communities should be remunerated with dignity for environmental
7These bills are being introduced by Deputies Anselmo de Jesus (PT-Rondoˆnia) and Antonio Palocci (PT-Sa˜o
Paulo) as well as by the Ministry of the Environment.
8Discussions with Acre state government ofﬁcials, August 2007.
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services provided for Brazil and the world by preserved areas in the face of climate change’
(Brazil, 2007).
The ‘extractive reserve’ (resex) was introduced onto the statute books in 1990 under the
administration of President Jose´ Sarney. This followed the rubber tappers’ campaign to
defend their lands in southern Acre against encroachment by cattle ranchers, which
culminated in the murder of their leader, Francisco ‘Chico’ Mendes in 1988 (Gross, 1989;
Revkin, 1990; Arnt, 1994). As the ﬁrst formal instrument in Brazil that attempted to
reconcile forest conservation with strengthening resource users’ livelihoods, it was a major
landmark in environmental policy for that country (Hall, 1997a,b). The ﬁrst four federal
reserves set up in Acre, Rondoˆnia and Amapa´ covered two million hectares, and by 2005 a
further 32 had been created in Amazonia with more in the pipeline (IBAMA, 2006). Resex
are jointly managed by local resource users and government agencies at federal or state
level under a form of cooperative, private usufruct on 30-year leases. Yet although they
have been quite successful in terms of containing deforestation, extractive reserves suffer
from continuing problems of over-dependence on single products, weak management,
lack of alternative income sources, poor levels of social investment and consequent
out-migration, which can deprive reserves of the human resources necessary for vigilance
and management purposes (Hall, 2006).
Agroforestry combines small-scale agriculture with the cultivation of perennial tree
crops (Brazil nuts, fruits, resins, palm products, etc.), replacing slash-and-burn farming
with sedentary production that minimises forest removal. Hundreds of such projects exist
in the Amazon region, and it is estimated that 35 million hectares of degraded lands could
be adapted for this purpose (Smith et al., 1998; FAO, 1999). Agroforestry schemes have a
highly mixed record of success, but the guarantee of a more stable income ﬂow from
environmental services could help many embryonic community schemes through their
initial phases, as envisaged in Proambiente, discussed above.
Sustainable forest management (SFM) caters for the growing international and Brazilian
market in certiﬁed timber. Brazil has 3.5 million hectares certiﬁed by the Forest
Stewardship Council (FSC) of which half lies in the Amazon. Of the country’s 62 certiﬁed
operations, 22 are in Amazonia (two large-scale commercial companies and the remainder
community-based). Brazil’s Law on the Management of Public Forests (2006) is designed
to expand this potential by promoting commercial and community concessions on
13 million hectares of publicly owned forests in Amazonia. Although general fears have
been expressed about government capacity for monitoring of compliance with SFM
guidelines, the law does for the ﬁrst time recognise the use of standing forest as a
‘productive’ sustainable development activity and hence a source of environmental
services which could in due course be sold.
In a region as vast as Brazilian Amazonia, the targeting of PES schemes in areas where
they are likely to be most effective becomes a critical issue. Although PES schemes might
be technically feasible, they may not be an attractive policy option everywhere. There may
be little sense in pushing PES either in well preserved areas with relatively little
anthropogenic pressure (such as Amazonas and Amapa´), or in states where commercial
pressures are so intense that PES cannot compete with logging, ranching and soybean
farming (for example, in Mato Grosso or Para´). It is in ‘middling’ areas of competing
interests where no single activity dominates in which PES may prove critical in tipping the
balance in favour of conservation, providing incentives for more sustainable forms of
development as a realistic alternative to large-scale forest conversion. Thus, in order to
make PES more efﬁcient, it would probably be necessary to target lands at high risk of
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being lost rather than adopt an indiscriminate ﬂat payment approach. However, the
efﬁciency criterion would have to be weighed up against equality of access to PES.
Research on avoided deforestation schemes in Mexican ejidos suggests that risk-targeted
payments are more efﬁcient environmentally speaking, but ﬂat payments are more
egalitarian (Alix-Garcia et al., 2003). In the Mexican case, it has been estimated that only
11 per cent of forests in the PES programme are high-risk (Karaousakis, 2007).
Establishing sources of revenue to fund PES schemes in Brazil is a major challenge. The
Bank of Amazonia, berated over the years for favouring cattle ranching and big business
over small producers, has an annual fund of about US$1.7 billion for production which
could be harnessed for PES (Arima et al., 2005). Following the practice in Costa Rica,
royalties could be charged on the activities of private companies in order to fund
conservation. Under a new Brazilian government proposal, ﬁrms whose activities generate
major environmental impacts would be required to pay 0.5 per cent of their turnover into an
Environmental Compensation Fund (CI, 2006). The ecological VAT discussed above is
another source, while the rural land tax could be reformed to reward conservation of forests
rather than their removal as a sign of ‘productive’ activity (Haddad and Rezende, 2002).
As already noted, new federal laws are planned to provide for the establishment of
government funding channels for PES schemes such as Proambiente.
There is little doubt that funding for PES in the Amazon would have to draw on
international sources to complement domestic ﬁnancing. The inclusion of avoided
deforestation under the Kyoto CDM during the second commitment period (2013–2017) is
a clear option open to negotiators. However, the country’s potential for capturing
international payments as a source of funding for sustainable development is limited by the
fact that there is strong resistance in some quarters to recognising the validity of avoided
deforestation as a source of carbon credits. Although environmental organisations and
community groups in Amazonia are strongly supportive of the idea, Brazil’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) has opposed it on the grounds that national sovereignty and
control over forest resources might somehow be compromised by undue foreign
involvement. This has always been a delicate issue in the strategically sensitive Amazon
region and the spectre of ‘foreign interference’ is periodically raised (Dreifuss, 2000).
In response to a suggestion by the UK Secretary of State for the Environment that the
Amazon rainforest should be ‘privatised’ in order to protect it, the Brazilian government
responded unequivocally that the region is ‘not for sale’ (Folha de Sa˜o Paulo, 2006; The
Independent, 2006). President Lula himself made a similar declaration at the UN General
Assembly in September 2007.9 Furthermore, the large European environmental NGOs
have also been against the proposal, which has been seen as letting the US and other
industrial powers off the hook in terms of reducing consumption of fossil fuels by allowing
them to buy ‘rainforest credits’ (Fearnside, 2001). This position has also been shared by
Brazil’s Ministry of Science and Technology (ESP, 2007a).
However, these entrenched positions are gradually softening. One proposal based on the
principle of ‘compensated reduction’ has been put forward (Santilli et al., 2005). Countries
choosing to reduce deforestation levels in relation to an agreed baseline would receive
post facto compensation in the form of tradable carbon certiﬁcates that would generate
income for promoting conservation and sustainable development. Two competing ideas
were aired at the 12th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on
9Claiming success for the federal government in reducing Amazon deforestation rates, he declared that, ‘under no
circumstances will Brazil forfeit its sovereignty nor its responsibility for Amazonia’ (ESP, 2007c).
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Climate Change (COP12) held in Nairobi in November 2006. The Coalition of Rainforest
Nations (a block of over 30 developing countries headed by Papua New Guinea and Costa
Rica) lobbied for the inclusion of avoided deforestation as a criterion for acquiring certiﬁed
emissions offsets within global carbon emissions markets in addition to reforestation and
afforestation (UNFCCC, 2005b; Heal and Conrad, 2006); Coalition for Rainforest Nations,
2006; Chomitz et al., 2007). The issue of providing compensation for ‘reduced emissions
from deforestation’ (RED), or maintenance of standing forest, is being considered by
scientiﬁc groups under the aegis of the UNFCCC. Recommendations were considered at
the Conference of the Parties (COP-13) held in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007, and the
issue of RED is currently under consideration by the scientiﬁc body of the UNFCCC.
At COP-12 in Nairobi, Brazil’s Minister of the Environment proposed the creation of a
voluntary international fund supported by the industrialised nations to compensate
countries for the ‘effective reduction of emission from deforestation’ rather than avoided
deforestation or carbon stock maintenance (UNFCCC, 2006b: p. 3). However, serious
doubts have been raised about the viability of a major voluntary fund such as that suggested
by Brazil compared with market-based alternatives. Avoluntary mechanism would have to
compete for scarce ofﬁcial development aid in the forestry sector. Furthermore, donors
would be reluctant to ﬁnance the scheme in the absence of veriﬁable measures of progress
towards meeting speciﬁc targets in reducing deforestation.
5 CONCLUSION
PES ventures in Brazilian Amazonia have so far been limited to a handful of carbon
projects, the ecological VAT and the incipient Proambiente programme for small farmers.
It could also be argued that much of the funding channelled into sustainable development
projects since the 1990s actually represents a form of indirect compensation for
environmental services rendered; for example, the small projects (PD/A) component of the
Pilot Programme to Conserve the Brazilian Rainforest (PPG7) in key activities such as
agroforestry, support for extractive reserves, sustainable forest management, ecotourism
and prevention of forest ﬁres (FAO, 1999). Yet this funding is neither contingent upon the
provision of quantiﬁed and monitored environmental services nor is ﬁnancial support
assured beyond the early years. Furthermore, the generation of environmental beneﬁts is
assumed to be an automatic by-product and there is no accounting system in place.
Promabiente itself as well as the Amazonas state-level PES scheme could also be accused
of the same shortcomings.
International cooperation to assist developing countries in preventing deforestation
through carbon trading is now regarded as one essential vehicle for mitigating the impacts
of global warming (Stern, 2006). While no panacea, it is increasingly seen as one viable
policy option if appropriately conceived and implemented. Yet neither should PES be
viewed through rose-coloured spectacles. Many problems must be overcome if its potential
is to be realised.
A major ﬁrst hurdle will be to establish appropriate funding mechanisms to ﬁnance PES
initiatives on a sustainable basis. In the early stages, overseas development assistance has
been instrumental in helping to kick-start PES schemes, as witnessed in the cases of Costa
Rica and Mexico, for example, where the World Bank, the Global Environmental Facility
(GEF) and bilateral donors have played a key role. Conversely, as discussed above, lack of
government funding has created major problems for Proambiente.
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Funding options for PES are on the increase internationally. Specialised funds already
exist, such as the BioCarbon Fund, set up in 2004 as a private sector trust managed by the
World Bank. The Bank’s US$128million Community Development Carbon Fund (CDCF),
a multi-donor Trust Fund, set up in 2003 to beneﬁt the poorest countries, could be extended.
The World Bank’s proposed ‘Global Forest Initiative’ would bring together major
conservation NGOs and the private sector, which would include a US$300 million Forest
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) to pilot RED schemes. However, according to some
observers, the potential for signiﬁcantly expanding voluntary transfer payments (along the
lines envisaged by the Brazilian government) to reduce deforestation is in reality extremely
limited. Since foreign aid for the forestry sector has been in decline for over a decade, it is
suggested that a project- or sector-based market approach could offer much greater
possibilities to reduce emissions from deforestation (Karaousakis, 2007).
Yet even assuming that it is possible to generate sufﬁcient ‘willingness to pay’ on the part
of buyers—by no means a foregone conclusion—this is but the ﬁrst step towards installing
an effective PES system (Wunder, 2005, 2006; Karaousakis, 2007). The actual imple-
mentation of PES schemes faces many operational challenges in terms of setting up an
appropriate legal framework and institutional structure, establishing a permanent funding
mechanism and introducing appropriate implementation methodologies. The latter
include, for example: (i) identifying those geographical areas where such payments are
likely to have most impact on environmental service provision, (ii) estimating carbon
emissions from forest conservation activities in diverse situations where the carbon content
of forests may vary considerably, (iii) documenting or quantifying the value of
environmental services against an agreed baseline to calculate payments, (iv) monitoring
compliance with agreed targets and guidelines, (v) deciding how to distribute available
resources while reconciling equity and programme efﬁciency in facilitating access to PES
schemes—should large producers who are normally responsible for most deforestation
be allowed to monopolise PES payments? (v) providing the required implementation
capacity amongst stakeholders, including agricultural extensionists, community-based
organisations, state ofﬁcials and ﬁnancial institutions, (vi) ensuring compliance and (vii)
facilitating cross-sector collaboration amongst government and non-governmental
organisations to promote an integrated approach in meeting the needs of resource-users.
An increasing number of countries seeking to conserve natural resources and support
local livelihoods are experimenting with PES schemes. Although only Costa Rica has a
national programme in place, many other nations are supporting individual projects and
area-based programmes (Mayrand and Paquin, 2004; McShane and Wells, 2004). Brazil
has been relatively slow on the uptake so far but RED discussions have widened the global
response to climate change. The government has gradually warmed to the principle of PES
and is supporting the idea of compensation for forest conservation, albeit through voluntary
international funding rather than via market-based carbon trading. However, before such
arrangements can be implemented, a number of problems would have to be resolved
(Ebeling, 2008). These include concerns over ‘market ﬂooding’ by a large volume of
credits which would depress carbon prices, the causality issue of attributing changes in
deforestation levels to government action (versus the impact of macro-economic forces
such as international commodity prices) and the possible non-permanence of emissions
reductions due to forest conservation as against reductions from fossil-fuel combustion.
However, even if agreement can be reached over these issues in a post-2012 policy
scenario and if some of the legal, bureaucratic and logistical problems mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs can be overcome, schemes such as Proambiente and Bolsa Floresta
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will become increasingly popular as a form of providing direct conservation incentives to
poor resource-users. Indeed, in such a large country as Brazil, decentralised, state-level
PES projects could prove particularly effective if applied in strategic areas under growing
threat of deforestation. While it would be a mistake to underestimate the difﬁculties
involved, paying the people for their contribution to conservation and sustainable
development promises to become a signiﬁcant arm of environmental policy in the Brazilian
Amazon.
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